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<b>Report No.</b>	HIAS-E-48
<b>Title</b>	Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
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<b>Abstract</b>	We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer besides her material well-being. A semi-responsible agent is an agent who, given what her opponents do, acts in an irresponsible manner when a responsible behavior poses obstacles to her material well-being. The class of efficient allocation rules that are Nash implementable is identified provided that there is at least <i>one</i> agent who is semi-responsible. The Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.
<b>Keywords</b>	Nash equilibrium, exchange economies, intrinsic preferences for responsibility, boundary problem, price-quantity mechanism
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