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<b>Report No.</b>	HIAS-E-60
<b>Title</b>	Robust Voting under Uncertainty
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<b>Abstract</b>	<p>This paper proposes normative consequentialist criteria for voting rules under Knightian uncertainty about individual preferences to characterize a weighted majority rule (WMR). The criteria stress the significance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized individual preferences. A voting rule is said to be robust if, for any probability distribution of preferences, responsiveness of at least one individual is greater than one-half. Our main result establishes that a voting rule is robust if and only if it is a WMR without ties. This characterization of a WMR avoiding the worst possible outcomes complements the well-known characterization of a WMR achieving the optimal outcomes, i.e., efficiency regarding responsiveness.</p>
<b>Keywords</b>	majority rule, weighted majority rule, responsiveness, Knightian uncertainty
<b>JEL</b>	D71, D81

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